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In with New Families, Out with Bad Law: Determining the 
Rights of Known Sperm Donors Through Intent-Based Written 
Agreements 
MARIA E. GARCIA* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
U.S. society is changing. Just turn on the television and see.  Each week, 
millions of devoted fans tune in to shows like “Modern Family” and “The New 
Normal,” which portray the lives of “non-traditional families,” including same-
sex couples with adopted children, surrogate mothers, and single parents.1  The 
market for television shows that feature “non-traditional families” demonstrates 
that U.S. society and values concerning the “traditional family” are changing and 
accepted.2 
Presently, U.S. society is no longer confined by the “Leave it to Beaver”3 
conception of the traditional family unit.  Statistical data gathered in the 2010 
U.S. Census demonstrates that over the last ten years, husband-wife households 
made up less than 50% of all U.S. households for the first time in U.S. history, 
while unmarried opposite sex households increased by 40%, and same-sex 
households increased by 80%.4  In accordance with popular culture’s evolution of 
the family unit, U.S. law has also evolved to reflect the rise of “non-traditional 
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 1. See Rick Kissel, ‘Modern Family’ Tops, ‘American Idol’ Hits Series Low on Wednesday, VARIETY 
(May 2, 2013, 9:21 AM), variety.com/2013/tv/news/modern-family-tops-american-idol-hits-series-
low-on-wednesday-1200440486/ (indicating that 9.5 million viewers watched “Modern Family” on a 
particular night).  “Modern Family” centers on the Pritchett family, which consists of Jay, the father, 
Mitchell, the son, and Claire, the daughter.  Jay is in his second marriage to a much younger woman, 
Gloria, who has a pre-teen son of her own.  Jay and Gloria also have a child of their own. Mitchell is 
gay and has a partner named Cameron.  They have an adopted baby girl.  Claire is married to Phil, 
and they have three children.  “The New Normal” centers on a gay couple, Bryan and David, who are 
seeking to welcome a baby into their lives.  They find Goldie, a single mother of a nine-year-old, who 
agrees to be their gestational surrogate.  Bryan, David, and Goldie develop a close friendship.  
Goldie’s mother is very much involved in her daughter and granddaughter’s lives. 
 2.  See Jessica R. Feinberg, Friends as Co-Parents, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 799, 803 (2009) (“Census 
officials note that ‘the increasing prevalence of non-traditional family structures reflects powerful 
societal trends that cannot be easily reversed.’”). 
 3.  “Leave it to Beaver” was a 1950s sitcom that featured a suburban, “all-American family” 
comprised of a professional father, a stay-at-home mother, and their two sons.  See Leave it to Beaver, 
IMDB. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0050032/ (last visited Oct 6, 2013). 
 4.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2010 5–6 (Apr. 2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf.  In addition, between 2000 and 2010, 
the number of female households with no spouse present and with own children increased by 10.6% 
and the number of male households with no spouse present and with own children increased by 
27.3%. 
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families.”  For instance, eleven states and Washington D.C. recognize same-sex 
couples’ right to marry.5  However, the law has not evolved as rapidly in other 
areas of family law that directly affect the construction of “non-traditional 
families.”  One such area is artificial insemination and the rights of sperm 
donors. 
Motherhood among lesbian women and single, unmarried heterosexual 
women is increasing in the U.S.6 This is in part due to scientific advancements in 
assisted reproductive technology (ART) and its growing use.7  Many women 
wishing to conceive do so through artificial insemination using a sperm donor.8  
While many women choose to be inseminated with semen from an anonymous 
donor, others use semen from a known donor.9  A woman’s preference for a 
known donor may stem from her increased opportunity to observe the behavior 
and characteristics of a man she knows, access his medical history, and reduce 
the costs associated with the procedure.10 
The law is well settled that anonymous donors relinquish their parental 
rights. As such, they cannot be sued for child support and cannot sue for 
parental rights.11  However, the law regarding parentage and the rights of known 
donors is somewhat nebulous and often outdated.  This note discusses the issues 
arising from these laws and the need for reform. 
The conflict of determining parentage and the rights of known sperm 
donors occurs primarily in two scenarios.12  In the first scenario, the recipient-
 
 5.  See FREEDOM TO MARRY, Freedomtomarry.org/states (last visited Oct 6, 2013) (listing 
Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, and Washington as states permitting same-sex marriage).  Note that over the four 
month period I wrote this note, the number of states permitting same-sex marriage jumped from 9 to 
11 states, with RI and DE added to the list this May, demonstrating how rapidly our acceptance of 
“non-traditional” families is moving forward. 
 6.  Justyn Lezin, (Mis)Conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally Unmarried Women’s Access to 
Reproductive Technology and Their Use of Known Donors, 14 HASTINGS’ WOMEN’S L.J. 185, 188 (2003). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Lezin, supra note 6, at 188; see also In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1029 (Kan. 2007) (where an 
unmarried female was artificially inseminated using semen from her friend); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 
940 A.2d 1236, 1238 (Pa. 2007) (where an unmarried female was artificially inseminated using semen 
from a former romantic partner). 
 10.  See Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Parental Obligations Between the Men 
Involved in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 949, 978-79 (2009) (noting that a 
woman may “be more comfortable using the sperm of a man she knows because she has been able to 
observe his behavior and ascertain his character . . . it [is] easier for the child to obtain his or her 
medical history . . . [and] the use of a known sperm donor eliminates the cost of the sperm and makes 
the use of a physician optional.”); see also Elizabeth E. McDonald, Sperm Donor or Thwarted Father? 
How Written Agreement Statutes are Changing the Way Courts Resolve Legal Parentage Issues in Assisted 
Reproduction Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 340, 340 (2009) (noting that modern users of ART often receive 
sperm from known donors such as “male friends or acquaintances . . . selected for a variety of 
reasons, including healthy medical histories or prestigious graduate degrees.”). 
 11.  See, e.g., Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 270 n.23 (Mass. 2002) (stating 
that anonymous sperm donors sign contracts relinquishing their parental rights which is a practice 
that the majority of states follow) (citation omitted). 
 12.  I have arrived at the existence of these two scenarios based on my own research and reading 
of cases.  I found these two scenarios to be the most prevalent causes of litigation regarding this 
matter. 
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mother approaches a known donor and the parties agree that the known donor 
will relinquish all parental rights and responsibilities if a child is conceived.  The 
recipient-mother agrees that she will not seek to hold the known donor 
responsible for financial or emotional support regarding the child.  In this 
scenario, the legal system becomes involved when the recipient-mother reneges 
on this agreement and files a claim against the known donor for child support. 
In the second scenario, a recipient-mother approaches a known donor and 
the parties agree that the known donor will have continued involvement in the 
child’s life.  This can range from full parental rights to visitation rights.  
However, after the child’s birth, the recipient-mother terminates the relationship 
between the known donor and the child and contests the existence or 
enforceability of any agreement.  It is important to note that in both the first and 
second scenario, the facts are often unclear as to whether there was an agreement 
between the parties or what the terms of any alleged agreement may be. 
This note examines the issues involved in determining parental and donor 
rights when mothers-to-be enter into agreements with known sperm donors.  
First, in section II, I discuss the evolution of the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 
from its conception in 1973 to its most recent articulation in 2002.  In section III, I 
briefly explain the intent-based approach to determining donor’s rights.  In 
section VI, I critique two types of state statutes that are applicable to parentage 
determinations in known-donor cases: licensed physician statutes and written 
agreement opt-out statutes.  In section V, I discuss the two scenarios mentioned 
above in which litigation ensues, and a donor’s rights and obligations are called 
into question.  In section VI, I discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. 
Granville and the challenge it may present to known-donors seeking visitation.  
In the note’s conclusion, I propose that the best approach to determining parental 
rights for known-donors is an intent-based model memorialized in a formal 
written contract enforceable in a court of law. 
II. THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT OF 1973 AND 2002 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted 
the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) in 1973.13 Currently, the 1973 UPA remains in 
effect in thirteen states, although some of these states have amended the act since 
its initial adoption.14 The 1973 UPA contains the following provision regarding 
the parental status of a donor: “The donor of semen provided to a licensed 
physician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the 
donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child 
thereby conceived.”15  This provision was designed to protect the married 
couples’ parental rights to a child conceived through artificial insemination.16  
 
 13.  See UNIF.  LAW COMMISSION, http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last 
visited Oct 6, 2013).  One of the principle reasons that the UPA was drafted was to provide the same 
rights to children born to unmarried parents as those provided to marital children. 
 14.  John J. Sampson, Uniform Family Laws and Model Acts, 42 FAM. L.Q. 673, 681 (2008) (noting 
that California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New 
Jersey, Ohio, and Rhode Island still retain versions of the 1973 UPA). 
 15.  UNIF.  PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973). 
 16.  See Justice Carol A. Beier & Larkin E. Walsh, Is What We Want What We Need, and Can We Get 
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However, the 1973 UPA provisions do not apply to unmarried women who 
undergo artificial insemination.  This, as well as advancements in ART and legal 
developments over approximately 30 years,17 led to the drafting of the 2002 
UPA.18 
The 2002 UPA takes a broader approach to parentage issues and governs 
ART for both married and unmarried women.19  The 2002 UPA also uses a 
gender-neutral approach to ART by using the unqualified term “donor,” without 
specifying a sperm or egg donor.20  Another significant change in the 2002 UPA 
is its modification of the parental status of a donor provision quoted above.  The 
2002 UPA simply states: “A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means 
of assisted reproduction.”21  An important divergence from the 1973 UPA is that 
the 2002 Act does not require that a sperm donor provide his semen to a 
physician in order to relinquish his parental rights and obligations.22  This 
distinction will be discussed in greater detail in section VI.  Currently, eight 
states have enacted the 2002 UPA.23  Among those eight states, Alabama is the 
only one to transition from the 1973 UPA to the 2002 UPA.24 
The differences between the 1973 UPA and 2002 UPA are important 
because, as mentioned, many states still utilize the outdated 1973 UPA.25  This is 
problematic since, unless amended, the 1973 UPA’s ART provisions apply only 
 
it in Writing? The Third-Wave of Feminism Hits the Beach of Modern Parentage Presumptions, 39 U. BALT. 
L.F. 26, 29 (2008) (noting that the design of the 1973 UPA was intended, in part, to “protect the 
expectations of married couples.”) 
 17. See Sampson, supra note 14, at 680-681. 
 18. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note (2002) (noting a “thoroughgoing revision of the 
Act” is warranted by the recent scientific advances and the states’ “widely differing treatment” on 
subjects both covered and uncovered by the Act.) 
 19.  Id. at § 702 cmt. 
 20.  Id. at § 702. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at § 702 cmt. (“This section shields all donors, whether of sperm or eggs, . . .from 
parenthood in all situations in which either a married woman or a single woman conceives a child 
through ART with the intent to be the child’s parent, either by herself or with a man.”). 
 23.  Sampson, supra note 14, at 681 (noting that Alabama, Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming have adopted the 2002 UPA). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  See Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 908–
09 (2012) (noting that courts struggle to apply outdated laws in ART disputes and going on to discuss 
the UPA).  The following states retain the 1973 UPA’s licensed physician requirement and still limit 
the ART statute to a married woman: Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Nevada.  
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106 (West 2009); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3 (West 2013); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. 40-6-106 
(West 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. 126.061 (West 2011).  Hawaii and Rhode Island do not appear to have a 
statute regulating ART.  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-1 (West 2013) & R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-1 (West 
2013).  California and Kansas retain the licensed physician requirement but the law applies to both 
married and single women, and contains written agreement opt-out provisions.  See CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 7613 (West 2013) & KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208 (West 2012).  California’s statute in particular 
provides for an “assisted reproduction agreement” allowing a donor to retain parental rights based 
on intent.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7606 (West 2013).  New Jersey and Ohio retain the licensed physician 
requirement but it applies to married and single women.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2013) 
and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.90, 3111.95 (West 2013). 
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to married women and require physician involvement.26  Thus, under the 1973 
UPA, when a donor provides a woman with sperm directly, rather than through 
a licensed physician, or when an unmarried woman uses a sperm donor to 
conceive, the UPA is inapplicable and a donor has not relinquished parental 
rights to the child.27  This situation can be the catalyst for litigation regarding the 
parentage of a child conceived through artificial insemination. The issues 
presented by the 1973 and 2002 UPA demonstrate why an intent-based model for 
determining parentage and donor’s rights should be the critical lens through 
which current ART and donor paternity statutes should be viewed. 
III. AN INTENT-BASED APPROACH TO DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF KNOWN DONORS 
The intent-based approach to rights of known donors is almost identical to 
the intent-based approach to parentage.  Professor John Lawrence Hill defines 
intended parents as “the person or couple who initially intended to raise the 
child.”28  In other words, the intended parents are the parties who “affirmatively 
intended the birth of the child,” “took the steps necessary to effect” ART, and 
“[b]ut for their acted-on intention, the child would not exist.”29  The intent-based 
approach to parentage determines the identity of the intended parents and 
legally enforces those intentions by declaring those parties legal parents.   
The intent-based model to determine parentage can also be used to 
determine the rights of known donors, which may or may not include legal 
parentage. In artificial insemination cases, a known donor may relinquish 
parental rights, retain full parental rights, or establish visitation rights without 
parental rights. Regardless of the agreement, a court should examine the parties’ 
intentions and determine the agreed upon relationship between the donor and 
the child.  The court should then assign rights to the donor accordingly. 
As I will discuss more fully, a formal written contract memorializes the 
intent of both parties while also capturing the best interests of the child.  This is 
because the formal, written contract makes clear which individuals are dedicated 
to the upbringing and care of the child, and therefore it can be assumed they 
have the child’s best interests at heart.30  Thus, an intent-based approach to 
determining rights of known donors is best because it honors the wishes of the 
parties and the construction of their “non-traditional family,” while also 
protecting the best interests of the child. 
 
 26.  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973). 
 27.  See Knaplund, supra note 25, at 908-09 (detailing how the 1973 UPA determined paternity 
only in situations where a man provided sperm to a licensed physician “for use by a married woman 
who was not the donor’s wife.”). 
 28.  John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for 
Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 356 n.12 (1991); see also Johnson v. Calvert, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 
500 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (citing to Professor Hill’s work and finding that in a surrogacy case, the 
woman who intended to bring about the birth of the child and intended to raise the child as her own 
was the natural mother). 
 29.  Calvert, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500. 
 30.  See McDonald, supra note 10, at 348 (explaining that written contracts designed to capture 
intent to parent establish care giving and parenting intention as essential determinates of parentage). 
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IV. TYPES OF STATUTES 
This section will focus on two different statutory schemes regulating ART 
and donors’ parental status. Licensed physician requirement statutes and written 
agreement opt-out statutes demonstrate which statutory scheme best honors the 
intent of the parties involved when known donor paternity and rights become 
the subject of litigation. 
A. Licensed Physician Requirement 
In 2009, William Marotta of Topeka, Kansas answered Angela Bauer and 
Jennifer Schreiner’s Craigslist ad seeking a sperm donor.31  Marotta provided the 
lesbian couple with his sperm and signed a contract waiving all parental rights 
and financial responsibility to the couple’s child.32  Marotta, who was not 
compensated for his donation, left thinking he had performed a good deed.33  
Schreiner and Bauer successfully performed an at-home insemination and 
Schreiner gave birth to a baby girl.34  However, since then, Marotta has found 
good reason to quote the well-known saying, “No good deed goes 
unpunished.”35   
In 2012, after Bauer and Schreiner ended their relationship, Schreiner sought 
public benefits for the child.36  In Kansas, when a single mother seeks welfare for 
a child, it is common for the Kansas Department for Children and Families to 
locate the child’s biological father and order him to pay support.37  In Marotta’s 
words, Schreiner was “coerced” and “pressured” by the State to identify him as 
the biological father.38  The State immediately filed a petition for child support 
against Marotta, identifying him as the legal father of Schreiner and Bauer’s 
daughter.39  Marotta has never provided financial support for the child, has only 
seen her twice, and is not in any way involved in her life.40 
Even though Marotta signed a contract relinquishing his parental rights to 
Bauer and Schreiner’s daughter, Kansas law recognizes him as the child’s legal 
 
 31.  See KS Sperm Donor Could be Forced to Pay Child Support (Fox News television broadcast), 
available at http://marottacase.com/index.php/component/k2/item/18-kan-sperm-donor-could-be-
forced-to-pay-child-support (interviewing Marotta regarding his legal battles with Schreiner) 
[hereinafter Fox News television broadcast]; see also Sperm Donor Liable for Child Support (CNN television 
broadcast), available at http://marottacase.com/index.php/component/k2/item/19-cnn-newsroom-
interview-sperm-donor-liable-for-child-support (profiling Marotta’s donation and subsequent legal 
battles) [hereinafter CNN television broadcast]. LS Rule 1.2 and 18.2.2. 
 32.  Fox News television broadcast, supra note 31. 
 33.  See id. 
 34.  See id. 
 35.  See id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  John Hanna, William Marotta, Kansas Sperm Donor to Lesbian Couple, Fighting Child Support 
Payments, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/01/02/william-marotta_n_2395412.html. 
 38.  Fox News television broadcast, supra note 31. 
 39.  See id. 
 40.  Fox News television broadcast, supra note 31. Accordingly, when Marotta was asked in a CNN 
interview if he would seek rights towards the child if ordered to pay child support, he replied, “No, 
because I’m not her parent.  That’s Jennifer and Angie.” See CNN television broadcast, supra note 31. 
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father.  This is because the applicable Kansas statute, which relieves sperm 
donors of their parental rights and responsibilities, requires a physician be 
involved in the insemination process.41  The Kansas statue reads: 
The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial 
insemination of a woman other than the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he 
were not the birth father of a child thereby conceived, unless agreed to in writing 
by the donor and the woman.42 
The Kansas statute is nearly identical to the outdated 1973 UPA, which also 
requires physician involvement in the insemination process in order for a 
donor’s parental rights to be waived.43 Other states, such as those that have 
enacted the 2002 UPA, have removed the licensed physician requirement.44  
Licensed physician requirements can lead to determinations of known donor 
rights contrary to the parties’ intent when a recipient-mother uses a known 
donor in artificial insemination and fails to involve a physician in the procedure. 
There are several reasons why women choose to self-inseminate rather than 
involve a physician. Physician-performed inseminations can be prohibitively 
expensive and are not generally covered by health insurance.45  While the actual 
insemination itself is not that costly, there can be associated medical bills for 
necessities such as ultrasounds, blood work, and fertility drugs, which quickly 
add up. Also, often times, more than one attempt at insemination may be 
needed.46  For many women, this process is unaffordable, especially when at-
home insemination is a comparatively simple and inexpensive procedure.47 
In addition, the licensed physician requirement may make donors reluctant 
to donate to women who choose to self-inseminate.48  In a state with a licensed 
physician requirement, donors are not protected from parental responsibilities 
when insemination occurs at home.  Therefore, there is a greater chance known 
 
 41.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(f) (West 2012). 
 42.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 43.  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973); see supra Section II. 
 44.  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2002); see supra Section II. 
 45.  See How Much Does Artificial Insemination Cost, COSTHELPER, health.costhelper.com/artificial-
insemination.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (noting it is common for insurers to exclude coverage of 
artificial insemination). 
 46. See Lucy R. Dollens, Artificial Insemination: Right of Privacy and the Difficulty in Maintaining 
Donor Anonymity, 35 IND. L. REV. 213, 214 (2001) (explaining that doctor performed insemination costs 
between $235 and $400 before blood work and medicine performed); see also How Much Does Artificial 
Insemination Cost, COSTHELPER, health.costhelper.com/artificial-insemination.html (last visited Oct. 6, 
2013) (noting that artificial insemination can range from $300-$500 per attempt and that the success 
rate is 10 to 20 percent, meaning that up to 10 attempts could be required before conception).  Note 
that the medical costs of artificial insemination will vary from woman to woman based on her 
medical needs and the facility she chooses.  Of course, whether or not a procedure is deemed 
“expensive” is also relative to the personal financial situation of each woman.  Thus, artificial 
insemination may not be “expensive” for every woman but it certainly could be for some. 
 47.  See Lezin, supra note 6, at 191 & n. 21 (noting that standard vaginal insemination is “often 
easily performed outside medical settings” and many women use the so-called “turkey-baster” 
method); see also E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 420 N.J. Super. 283, 285 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2011) (“Plaintiff is 
a single woman . . . [who] did not wish to assume the expense of purchasing sperm through a sperm 
bank or use a licensed physician in order to effect the insemination.”). 
 48.  Lewis, supra note 10, at 984. 
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donors can be sued for paternity and child support.49  Thus, because of the law, 
many women who cannot meet the licensed physician requirement are hindered 
or foreclosed from having children.50 
The licensed physician requirement is not only an unnecessary burden to 
women; in many cases, strict adherence fails to properly honor the rights of 
known donors and recipient-mothers.  When the licensed physician requirement 
is not met, courts may find that the donor did not relinquish parental rights and 
can be ordered to pay child support.  Such a result disregards the parties’ intent 
and is disrespectful to the family structure that the parties seek to create. 
Two cases, Jhordan C. v. Mary K. and E.E. v. O.M.G.R., demonstrate the 
unfavorable outcomes that the licensed physician requirement can have on 
known donors and recipient-mothers.  Although Jhordan C. is a 1986 decision and 
California law has since been modified, its facts and analysis are still relevant 
today, as courts today continue to  rely on it for guidance.51 
Jhordan C. dealt with a California artificial insemination statute that 
contained a licensed physician requirement. The statute stated: “The donor of 
semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a 
woman other than the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural 
father of a child thereby conceived.”52 The facts were as follows: Mary and her 
partner Victoria decided to have a child through artificial insemination and to 
raise the child together.53  The couple met Jhordan through mutual friends and 
chose him as their sperm donor.54  The parties’ versions of their pre-insemination 
oral agreement were conflicting.55  According to Mary, she told Jhordan she did 
not want a donor who would have continued involvement with the child after 
his birth.56  However, once the child was born she permitted Jhordan to see the 
child to “satisfy his curiosity.”57  According to Jhordan, he and Mary agreed he 
would have continued involvement with the child and he would care for the 
child two or three times per week.58  The parties’ pre-insemination oral 
agreement was not formalized into a written agreement, nor did either party 
seek legal advice.59  Nevertheless, Jhordan provided his sperm to Mary and she 
performed an at-home self-insemination and became pregnant.60 
At trial, although the parties disputed the terms of their oral agreement, 
they agreed on the following facts:61 During Mary’s pregnancy, Jhordan visited 
her at work, took photographs of her, told her he obtained a playpen, crib, and 
 
 49.  See CNN television broadcast, supra note 31 (when Marotta is asked if he would do this again 
had he known what would happen, he responds, “Probably not.”). 
 50.  Lewis, supra note 10, at 984. 
 51.  See E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 420 N.J. Super. at 289. 
 52.  Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 53.  Id. at 389. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 390. 
 61.  Id. 
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high chair for her child, told her he started a trust fund for the child, and stated 
that he wanted to be the child’s legal guardian in case Mary died.62  Mary told 
Jhordan to keep the baby items at his home, and denied his request for 
guardianship, but approved of the trust fund.63 Jhordan was not involved in 
Mary’s pre-natal care; rather, Victoria accompanied Mary to her medical 
appointments.64 However, when the child was born, Jhordan was listed on the 
child’s birth certificate.65 Jhordan visited the child the day after he was born and 
took pictures of him.66 Five days later, he called Mary to see if he could visit the 
child again.67 While Mary initially resisted, she allowed Jhordan to visit.68  At 
that time, Jhordan claimed a right to see the child and Mary agreed to monthly 
visits.69 Jhordan visited the child on about five more occasions before Mary 
terminated the visits.70 Soon after, Jhordan filed suit against Mary to establish 
paternity and visitation rights.71 The trial court declared Jhordan the child’s legal 
father and granted him visitation.72 Mary and Victoria appealed the trial court’s 
decision. 
On appeal, the court focused its analysis on the licensed physician 
requirement of the California statute, since Mary’s self-insemination was non-
compliant with the statute.  The court described the statute’s provisions as 
“derived almost verbatim from the [1973] UPA.”73  The court then gave two 
justifications for the licensed physician requirement.74  First, physician 
involvement allows a doctor to obtain the complete medical history of the donor 
and screen for disease.75  Second, the physician is a “professional third-party” 
who, for evidentiary purposes, can “create a formal, documented structure for 
the donor-recipient relationship” in case a dispute arises between the donor and 
recipient.76  The court went on to admit that “nothing inherent in artificial 
insemination requires the involvement of a physician” as it is a simple procedure 
easily performed at home.77  In addition, the court recognized that the licensed 
physician requirement may “offend a woman’s sense of privacy and 
reproductive autonomy, might result in burdensome costs to some women, and 
might interfere with a woman’s desire to conduct the procedure in a comfortable 
environment such as her own home or to choose the donor herself.”78  Yet still, 
 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 391. 
 73.  Id. at 392. 
 74.  Id. at 393. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 393-94. 
 78.  Id. at 394. 
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the appellate court found that because the parties did not comply with the 
licensed physician requirement, Jhordan had not relinquished his parental rights, 
and thus, Jhordan was the legal father of Mary’s child.79 
First, Jhordan demonstrates why oral agreements regarding known donor 
insemination are problematic. Jhordan and Mary gave conflicting testimony 
about the terms of their oral agreement.80 From the start, the court had few 
concrete facts to help determine what the parties had agreed to and what 
Jhordan’s rights should be.  The court’s interpretation of the facts would have 
been aided by a formal, written agreement between the parties. 
Second, the decision in Jhordan C. does not honor the parties’ intent.  
Although the factual dispute makes it more difficult to determine the parties’ 
intentions, the parties agreed that Mary became pregnant with the intention of 
parenting her child with Victoria.81 The facts indicate that Mary and Victoria 
were co-parenting the child, who spent at least two days a week at Victoria’s 
home and spoke with her by phone on the days they were apart.82  Mary and 
Victoria discussed their child daily and made joint decisions about his care and 
upbringing.83  The women and their child took vacations together, and the child 
regarded Victoria’s parents as his grandparents.84 Thus, even though the facts 
suggest that Mary and Victoria might have agreed to an ongoing relationship 
between Jhordan and their child, as evidenced by Mary’s acceptance of the trust 
fund and acquiescence to monthly visitation, it does not seem likely that the 
parties agreed to Jhordan retaining full legal status as a parent.85 Even Jhordan 
never claims that he was to be the child’s legal parent, but rather that he would 
have an ongoing relationship with the child.86 
Thus, assuming that the parties’ intentions were for Mary and Victoria to be 
parents, and for Jhordan to have an ongoing relationship with the child, the 
appellate court’s reliance on the licensed physician requirement and grant of 
legal parentage to Jhordan does not honor the parties’ intentions. By considering 
the licensed physician requirement as the lynchpin in determining parentage, the 
court disregards the parties’ intentions as well as the best interests of the child. 
Since Jhordan, California has amended its parentage act to create a statutory 
scheme that now borrows from both the 1973 UPA and the 2002 UPA.87  While 
California still requires physician involvement in artificial insemination for the 
relinquishment of donor’s parental rights to be effective, the law now provides 
that a donor can retain parental rights if this decision is “agreed to in a writing 
signed by the donor and the woman prior to the conception of the child.”88  In 
addition, California law now defines an “assisted reproduction agreement” as “a 
 
 79.  Id. at 398. 
 80.  Id. at 389. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 391. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  See id. at 389-91. 
 86.  See id. at 389. 
 87.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (2012). 
 88.  Id. at § 7613(b) (2012). 
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written contract that includes a person who intends to be a legal parent of a child 
or children born through assisted reproduction and that defines the terms of the 
relationship between the parties to the contract.”89  Also, California law provides 
that a party to the assisted reproduction agreement may bring an action to 
establish the parent-child relationship “consistent with the intent expressed in 
that assisted reproduction agreement.”90  Thus, California’s addition of a written 
provision requirement in determining donor paternity utilizes an intent-based 
approach by regarding the written agreement as a memorial of the parties’ 
intentions and mechanism to enforce these intentions.  While this does not 
circumvent the licensed physician requirement, it does defer to the parties’ intent 
where there is a written agreement.91 
Although California laws regarding ART have evolved since Jhordan, recent 
court decisions still look to Jhordan for guidance.  For instance, in E.E. v. 
O.M.G.R., a 2011 New Jersey Superior Court dealt with a case where E.E., a 
single woman, performed an at-home insemination with her friend, O.M.G.R.’s 
sperm donation.92  E.E. opted for at-home insemination because she did not wish 
to accrue the expenses of acquiring sperm from a sperm bank or a physician.93  
After E.E. became pregnant, she and O.M.G.R. entered into a notarized, written 
contract where E.E. would be the “sole parent and provider for the child” while 
relinquishing O.M.G.R. of “financial or emotional support” as well as parental 
rights.94  In addition, after the child’s birth, E.E. and O.M.G.R. signed a consent 
order in which O.M.G.R. relinquished parental rights and responsibilities and 
E.E. assumed all financial and emotional responsibility for the child.95  However, 
the court denied the motion for termination of O.M.G.R.’s parental rights 
because the parties did not comply with the licensed physician requirement, and 
O.M.G.R. did not relinquish parental rights.96 As such, O.M.G.R. was the child’s 
legal parent.97 
Concluding that New Jersey’s ART statutes did not apply, the court 
analyzed this case outside the context of artificial insemination, and instead as a 
matter of child custody, as if the parties had conceived a child through sexual 
intercourse.98  This is part of the danger in the strict application of licensed 
physician statutes, where courts resort to application of law that is not meant to 
apply to artificial insemination cases. 
The court began with the premise that “a child has the right to the security 
 
 89.  Id. at § 7606. 
 90.  Id. at § 7630(f). 
 91.  Furthermore, California law has made great strides in applying the intent-based model in 
other areas of ART, like surrogacy.  See Johnson v. Calvert, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 500 (Cal. 1993) (en 
banc) (using intent to determine parentage in a surrogacy case).  (KR Rule 10). 
 92.  E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 420 N.J. Super. 283, 285-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2011). 
 93.  Id. at 285. 
 94.  Id. at 286. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 293-94. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  See id. at 293 (noting that although donor has parental rights, he has chosen not to exercise 
them). 
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of two parents at the time of birth.”99  Working from this premise, the court cited 
to a case in which a divorcing couple’s separation agreement contained 
provisions terminating the husband’s parental rights to the marital child.100  The 
E.E. court stated that parties cannot contract to terminate parental rights, and 
that “a child’s relationship with his or her parents is so significant that all doubts 
are to be resolved against the destruction of that relationship.”101  However, the 
application of this principle to the situation between E.E. and O.M.G.R. is 
inappropriate.  There is a stark distinction between a husband who attempts to 
shirk his parental obligations towards a child he intended to parent, and a sperm 
donor relinquishing parental rights to a child he never intended to parent. 
Furthermore, the court made clear that biology is determinative of 
parentage except in the case of artificial insemination where parties strictly 
comply with the licensed physician requirement.102  The court stated: 
Although this court can see by the parties’ original agreement that the intent was 
to have defendant’s role limited to supplying biological material and for 
defendant to be absolved from further liability, the parties failed to abide by the 
statute in failing to use a physician . . . . Accordingly, this court is bound to 
follow the language of the statute and may not ignore a portion of the statue 
because of the parties’ intent.103 
Here, the court declared O.M.G.R. a legal parent, despite expressly 
acknowledging that the parties’ intentions were contrary to the court’s decision.  
The court ultimately granted sole custody to E.E. and did not order O.M.G.R. to 
pay child support because E.E. was not seeking any.104  However, the court did 
not terminate O.M.G.R.’s parental rights and implied that this result was suitable 
so long as O.M.G.R. refrained from exercising his parental rights.105  This 
suggests that if, at a later date, O.M.G.R. chose to exercise his parental rights, the 
outcome might be different.106 Thus, the court left E.E.’s parental rights 
vulnerable to subsequent challenge from O.M.G.R. 
The court’s decision in E.E. is problematic for several reasons.  To begin 
with, the court seems pegged between two policy decisions, and as such, reaches 
a conclusion that is not entirely sound.  The court strictly adheres to the licensed 
physician requirement and finds that O.M.G.R. is the legal parent, yet the court 
 
 99.  Id. at 286 (citing C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 167 (N.J. Super. Ct. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 
1977). Note that C.M. v. C.C. is a 1977 case in which a woman conceived of a child by self-
insemination of sperm from a known donor, a man she had had a prior dating relationship with.  In 
that case, the court stated, “if an unmarried woman conceives a child through artificial insemination 
from semen from a known man, that man cannot be considered to be less a father because he is not 
married to the woman.” C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. at 167. 
 100.  Id. at 287 (citing R.H. v. M.K., 254 N.J. Super. 480 (Ch. Div. 1991)). 
 101.  Id. at 287-88. 
 102.  See id. at 288-89. 
 103.  Id. at 292–93. 
 104.  Id. at 293. 
 105.  See id. (“[O.M.G.R.] . . . has made the choice not to exercise his parental rights and, should 
that continue by agreement between the parties, the court sees no reason to impose a different 
result.”). 
 106.  See id. (“The court expresses no opinion as to the appropriateness of the termination of 
defendant’s parental rights at a later date.”). 
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does not hold him accountable for child support.107  This decision seeks to 
uphold the policy that every child should have two parents and that a parent 
cannot contract away support.  However, the court’s decision does not actually 
enforce this policy because even though O.M.G.R. is a legal parent, he has no 
obligations.  Here, the court’s decision would have been more favorable had it 
either enforced the parties’ written agreement and honored their intentions, or, 
in adherence to the licensed physician requirement, found O.M.G.R. the legal 
parent, and enforced its policy concerns by ordering O.M.G.R. to pay child 
support. 
In addition, although the practical effects of the court’s ruling enforced the 
parties’ intentions, the holding creates ambiguity.  For instance, what would 
happen if years went by and O.M.G.R. decided to exercise his parental rights or 
if E.E. decided she did want child support from O.M.G.R? What would happen if 
O.M.G.R. did not exercise his parental rights and E.E. sought a termination of his 
parental rights or wanted a partner to adopt her child?  This open-ended result 
demonstrates why an intent-based approach memorialized in a written 
document is desirable.  Binding both parties to the intent manifested in a pre-
insemination written agreement creates certainty and closure.  It protects a donor 
seeking to relinquish parental rights from the chance that he will one day be 
forced to pay child support, while reassuring the recipient-mother that a donor 
cannot assert parental rights against her child.  By the same token, an intent-
based model legitimizes and protects any relationship between a donor and the 
child that was agreed to by both the mother and donor.  The disconcerting 
takeaway from E.E. is that the parties did enter into a seemingly valid pre-
insemination agreement, yet the court failed to enforce it. 
In sum, statutes with licensed physician requirements create problematic 
results for sperm donors and recipient-mothers. While the policy rationales 
behind licensed physician requirements are important, pre-insemination written 
agreements can serve the same function as physician involvement.  As the court 
stated in Jhordan C., physician involvement allows a doctor to obtain the medical 
history of the donor, while simultaneously serving an evidentiary purpose, and 
creating a formal structure to the donor-recipient relationship in case a dispute 
arises.108 
There are several reasons why a physician is not required to satisfy either of 
these concerns.  First, one of the reasons women choose known sperm donors is 
because they have easy access to their medical history.109  If a woman does not 
know the medical history of her known donor, she can easily ask him.  
Moreover, even if a woman obtains sperm from a sperm bank and conducts a 
self-insemination, she does not need a physician to obtain the medical history of 
the donor.  This is because sperm banks screen their donors and do not accept or 
distribute sperm that may contain infectious diseases.110  Thus, physician 
 
 107.  See id. at 292–93. 
 108.  Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 393 (1986). 
 109.  See Lezin, supra note 6, at 208 n.132. 
 110.  See Donor Screening, FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, http://www.fairfaxcryobank.com/ 
donorscreen.shtml  (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (explaining that this sperm bank (1) requires each 
applicant to have a physical exam and have their genetic and medical history evaluated by a clinical 
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involvement in the insemination process does not serve a unique purpose and its 
function can be easily accomplished through simple inquiry or routine screening 
at a sperm bank. 
Second, a physician is not required for evidentiary purposes or to create a 
“formal, documented structure”111 when a written contract can serve this exact 
function.  A pre-insemination agreement entered into by the donor and mother 
with terms specifying the donor’s rights and obligations preserves the parties’ 
intentions in a binding contract that is enforceable in a court of law.  This 
contract provides the same degree of formality as physician involvement and 
acts as a tool judges can consult when disputes arise between the donor and 
mother. 112 Hence, the purpose behind licensed physician requirements can still 
be achieved through other means.  The next section discusses donor paternity 
statutes that provide for written agreements. 
B. Written Agreement Opt-Out Statutes 
Several states have written agreement, opt-out statutes which are more 
favorable to determining the rights of known donors and recipient-mothers 
based on their intent.  These statutes allow donors and recipient-mothers to 
retain parental rights by opting-out of the default donor paternity bar in a 
written agreement.  While these statutes focus on donor retention of full parental 
rights, I argue that written contracts should also be used in situations where 
donors relinquish all parental rights or contract for visitation. 
Despite its unfavorable licensed physician requirement, California’s donor 
paternity statute is one example of a written agreement, opt-out statute: 
The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician . . . for use in artificial 
insemination . . . of a woman other than the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he 
were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived, unless otherwise agreed to 
in a writing signed by the donor and the woman prior to the conception of the child.113 
Other states like New Jersey, Kansas, and New Hampshire have also 
adopted similar statutes that provide a mechanism for known sperm donors to 
enter into private agreements with recipient-mothers preserving their parental 
rights.114 
Written agreement, opt-out statutes are favorable in determining parentage 
 
geneticist and (2) tests donor for infectious diseases and then retests six months after the sperm is 
donated and quarantined for HIV, hepatitis, syphilis, gonorrhea, and Chlamydia.); see also What Does 
Sperm Donation Involve?, http://www.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/reprotech/ 
New%20Ways%20of%20Making%20Babies/spermint.htm  (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (detailing the 
process for screening of sperm donors, noting that only 5% of all applicants who apply to donate 
sperm meet the criteria and that applicants go through a “rigorous” screening process before they 
may donate, including a blood screening, genetic screening, specimen screening, and physical 
analysis.). 
 111. See Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 at 393. 
 112. See infra Section VII for a more specific discussion of what parties should include in a pre-
insemination contract. 
 113.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (emphasis added). 
 114.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208 (West  2012); N.H. REV. 
STAT. 168-B: 3 (West 2013). 
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because they protect and honor the parties’ intentions.  The parties’ intentions 
include their carefully thought out future plans, including the best interests of 
the child,115 and their desire for a clear written agreement which allows them to 
predict how the contract will be enforced in case of a dispute.116  In Professor 
Marjorie Maguire Shultz’s view, “legal rules governing modern procreative 
arrangements and parental status should recognize the importance and the 
legitimacy of individual efforts to project intentions and decisions into the 
future.”117  Professor Shultz explains that the actions between the parties in ART 
are deliberative, explicit, and bargained-for by the nature of ART.118 Choosing 
ART requires “planning . . . time, effort, emotion and money expended; and the 
involvement of non-intimates [such as] professionals and reproductive 
participants.”119 Shultz explains that the parties in an ART agreement are “non-
intimates” who place great need on formal dispute resolution since they have 
serious expectations and rely on the arrangement with the other party.120 In this 
way, ART is different from procreation achieved through sexual intercourse, 
which does not usually involve the same degree of preparation as ART and 
presumes intent between the two sexual partners.121  Thus, where the parties’ 
intentions are manifested in such a deliberative, explicit, and bargained-for way 
and “where they are the catalyst for reliance and expectations,” such intentions 
should be honored.122  Courts should defer to and uphold such an agreement 
memorialized in writing because it is clear that the parties contemplated an 
arrangement that reflects their needs and wishes. 
In addition, private contracts create predictability, clarity, enforceability, 
and formality.123  Predictability is particularly important because it brings finality 
 
 115.  See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An 
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 326 n.80 (1990) (“[A] child’s bests interests 
will, in many an ordinary case, be best served by effectuating the deliberate intentions of his 
parents.”); see also Hill, supra note 28, at 356 n.12 (explaining that a requirement to be an intended 
parent is to gain the “constructive consent of the child.”). 
 116.  See Shultz, supra note 115, at 324 (noting that “[w]here artificial or assisted reproductive 
techniques are used, the need to reduce uncertainty, to project decisions into the future, and to 
protect reciprocal expectations and reliance is especially significant.”). 
 117.  See id. at 302. 
 118.  Id. at 324. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See id. (noting that coital partners are given parental status in part because of their presumed 
intention, whereas in ART this may be more difficult to discern).  It should be noted that although 
ART requires advanced planning, conception through sexual intercourse can also involve advanced 
planning, timing, and involvement of physicians in cases where couples have difficulty conceiving 
naturally.  However, ART and sexual intercourse are still distinguishable when it comes to intent, 
since conception through ART may or may not involve genetic material from an individual without 
parental intent, whereas in sexual intercourse, it is presumed that both parties intend to parent the 
child by virtue of their act. 
 122.  Id. at 302-03. 
 123.  See In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1039 (Kan. 2007) (“[R]equirement that any such agreement 
be in writing enhances predictability, clarity, and enforceability.”); see also McDonald, supra note 10, 
at 343 (quoting this language in KMH to demonstrate why written agreements in the ART context are 
favorable). 
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and closure to the parenting agreement.124  A written agreement puts both the 
known donor and recipient on notice about future custody or child support 
battles.  Under an opt-out provision, a donor who has not entered into a written 
agreement is foreclosed from bringing a paternity claim while the recipient-
mother is foreclosed from seeking child support.125  Similarly, if there is a written 
agreement, the parties know that the terms of their arrangement are 
memorialized in writing and what those terms are.  A written agreement makes 
those terms easier to enforce if a dispute should arise. 
In addition, a written agreement adds an element of formality to the 
arrangement between the known donor and the recipient-mother.126  This air of 
legitimacy may also encourage the parties to carefully consider the terms of their 
agreement and the gravity of knowing that they are creating a legal document 
enforceable in court.127  Also, written agreements serve as tools for pre-emptive 
conflict resolution.128  In entering into an agreement, the donor and recipient-
mother are compelled to contemplate the best care arrangements and 
responsibilities of each parent.  Thus, private ordering allows parties to 
anticipate any conflicts or misunderstandings they might have and work them 
out before the child is conceived or born. 
Lastly, written agreement provisions contemplate and, in turn, protect the 
best interests of the child.  These statutes bar known donors from acquiring any 
parental rights to a child merely by helping the recipient-mother conceive. 
Instead, they must execute a written agreement.  In this way, the statute makes 
clear that the sole donation of genetic material does not make a donor a legal 
father.129  The written agreement provision places the intent to be a parent at the 
core of gaining legal rights.  This serves the best interests of the child because it 
“diminish[es] importance on genetic or biological connection and looks instead 
to established caregiving or clearly established parenting intention as essential, 
or at least co-equal, determinants of parentage.”130 Using intent to parent and 
provide for a child as a primary factor in determining parentage is not only 
intuitive, but creates a greater likelihood that a child will grow up in a nurturing 
and caring home. 
Statutes that contain written agreement, opt-out provisions protect the 
rights of known sperm donors and recipient-mothers by preserving their intent, 
ensuring predictability, clarity, and enforceability.  However, it should be noted 
 
 124.  See K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1039. 
 125.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b). 
 126.  See In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that an 
agreement between a known donor and recipient-mother was enforceable in part because it had the 
formalities of a legitimate legal contract). 
 127.  See id. at 1261 (explaining that the formal contract in this case reflected the parties’ “careful 
consideration of the implications of such an agreement and a thorough understanding of its meaning 
and import.”). 
 128.  See K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1039 (stating that the written agreement provision under discussion 
is meant to encourage early resolution of parental rights). 
 129.   See id. at 1041 (“If . . . [a] genetic relationship must be destiny, then an anonymous donor 
with no intention to be a father would nevertheless automatically become one.”). LS Rule 10.6. 
 130.   David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and 
Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 136 (2006). 
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that these written agreement statutes are not broad enough to encompass the 
variety of arrangements that known donors and recipient-mothers may wish to 
create. The typical written agreement provision only applies to situations where 
the known donor seeks to be a legal parent but does not apply to situations 
where the parties agree that the known donor relinquishes all parental rights, or 
contracts for limited rights such as visitation.  Later in this note, I propose that 
written agreements should be required by law for all such arrangements, 
including full parental rights, no parental rights, or visitation rights. 
V. KNOWN DONORS RELINQUISHING PARENTAL RIGHTS: THE PUBLIC POLICY 
CONCERNS 
As with written agreements to retain parental rights, courts should enforce 
agreements in which a known donor relinquishes parental rights and 
responsibilities, so long as they do not violate public policy.  Where agreements 
satisfy public policy, intent should be the guiding factor in determining known 
donor’s rights and obligations. 
In Ferguson v. McKiernan, a 2007 case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
analyzed the public policy implications of agreements in which a known donor 
relinquishes full parental rights.131  There, a known donor provided sperm to the 
recipient-mother, a former romantic partner.132  The recipient-mother preferred 
the known donor to an anonymous donor because “‘[s]he knew [his] 
background. . . [and] makeup, and just said that she preferred to have that 
anonymous donor known to her.’”133  Although the recipient-mother knew the 
donor, the terms of the oral agreement were constructed to mirror an anonymous 
sperm donation.134  The insemination was to take place in a clinical setting, the 
donor’s role would be confidential, the donor would not seek visitation or 
custody, and the recipient-mother would not demand financial or emotional 
support.135  Accordingly, the donor did not assist the recipient-mother with pre-
natal or post-natal care, nor was he listed on the twins’ birth certificate.136  Five 
years went by without any deviation from the parties’ agreement.137  During 
those five years, the donor and mother lost contact.138  The donor moved to 
another town, married, and fathered his own child.139  Then, the recipient-mother 
unexpectedly filed for child support against the donor.140 
The trial court found that the parties had a binding oral agreement, but that 
“‘a parent cannot bind a child or bargain away that child’s right to support’” and 
therefore the agreement was unenforceable against public policy.141  
 
 131.  See Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1244-45 (Pa. 2007). 
 132.  Id. at 1238. 
 133.  Id. at 1239 n.4. 
 134.  Id. at 1238. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 1240–41. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 1240. 
 139.  Id. at 1241. 
 140.  See id. at 1240. 
 141.  Id. at 1241. (The trial court stated, “[T]his Court cannot ignore and callously disregard the 
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Accordingly, the donor was declared the twins’ legal father and ordered to pay 
$1,384 per month and $66,033.66 in arrearages due immediately.142  Interestingly, 
the trial court found “ample evidence” of the donor’s intention to surrender his 
rights and responsibilities to the child and, moreover, that the recipient-mother’s 
testimony “contained numerous inconsistencies and contradictions . . . 
intentional falsehoods, fraud, and deceit.”143  However, the court ignored the 
mother’s deceptive conduct and the parties’ agreement in favor of providing the 
twins with a legal father and additional means of financial support.144  The 
Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision on the same grounds.145 
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the parties’ 
agreement was enforceable and reversed the lower court’s child support order.146  
The Supreme Court applied the following definition of public policy: 
Only dominant public policy would justify such action [of invalidating a 
contract].  In the absence of a plain indication of that policy through long 
governmental practice or statutory enactments, or of violations of obvious ethical 
or moral standards, the Court should not assume to declare contracts . . . 
contrary to public policy.  The courts must be content to await legislative 
action.147 
In its reasoning, the court noted the prevalence of ART and the use of 
written ART agreements in contemporary society.148 The court also noted a 
“growing consensus” that institutional sperm donation does not automatically 
give rights or obligations to a sperm donor.149  In addition, the court looked to 
the absence of a legislative mandate as an indication that there was no strong 
public policy against donor’s relinquishing their parental rights.150  The court 
then equated the known donor in this case to an anonymous donor by finding 
 
interests of the unheard-from third party[,] a party who without their privity to this contract renders 
it void.”). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  See Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1241.; see also supra Section III(A) and accompanying discussion 
about the policy concerns in E.E. v. O.M.G.R. 
 145.  See Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1241.  Note that Pennsylvania has not enacted either the 1973 or 
2002 UPA and did not reach its decision in Ferguson at the lower court, superior court, or supreme 
court level by construing either UPA or any Pennsylvania donor paternity statute. 
 146.  Id. at 1248. 
 147.  Id. at 1245 n. 16. 
 148.  See id. at 1245 (noting that “all manner of arrangements involving the donation of sperm or 
eggs abound in contemporary society” and that “[a]n increasing number of would-be mothers . . . are 
turning to donor arrangements.”) 
 149.  See id. at 1246.  Note that the court refers to anonymous sperm donations via sperm bank as 
“clinical, institutional” sperm donations.  Hence, it is unclear whether the court requires a clinical 
setting and physician involvement in order for relinquishment of anonymous sperm donor’s parental 
rights to satisfy public policy.  In any case, the court’s analysis suggests that when a known donor 
functions as an anonymous donor in other respects like maintaining anonymity and taking sexual 
intercourse out of the equation, a known donor’s relinquishment of parental rights does not violate 
public policy. 
 150.  See id. at 1248 (noting that “The absence of a legislative mandate . . . illustrate[s] the very 
opposite of unanimity with regard to the legal relationships arising from sperm donation, whether 
anonymous or otherwise.”). 
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that the parties negotiated an agreement outside a romantic relationship, agreed 
to the terms, eliminated sexual intercourse as a factor by performing the ART 
procedure in a clinical setting, attempted to conceal the known donor’s paternity, 
and adhered to the agreement for five years.151  The court then noted that 
anonymous donors routinely enter into contracts with sperm banks relinquishing 
their parental rights.152 Therefore, because the agreement in this case did not 
violate a “dominant public policy” or “obvious ethical or moral standards,” it 
was not void against public policy and the agreement was enforceable.153  In 
addition, the Supreme Court’s analysis focused on the parties’ intentions.  It 
wrote: “The facts of this case . . . reveal the parties’ mutual intention to preserve 
all of the trappings of a conventional sperm donation, including formation of a 
binding agreement.”154 
Moreover, the decision in Ferguson acknowledged the appropriate weight 
that should be given to the interests of known donors and children conceived by 
ART.  The court noted: 
This Court takes very seriously the best interests of the children of this 
Commonwealth, and we recognize that to rule in favor of Sperm Donor in this 
case denies a source of support to two children who did not ask to be born into 
this situation.  Absent the parties’ agreement, however, the twins would not have 
been born at all, or would have been born to a different and anonymous sperm 
donor, who neither party disputes would be safe from a support order.155 
Here the court appropriately acknowledged the best interests of the 
children.  However, the court recognized that it must also weigh the donor’s 
interests and the parties’ intentions.  In so doing, the court reached the right 
result and reversed the child support order. 
Ferguson makes clear that when known donors act like anonymous donors 
and have no intention to parent a child, they do not violate public policy in 
relinquishing their parental rights.156  While the court in Ferguson reached the 
right outcome, not all agreements in which known donors relinquish parental 
rights should be enforced.  For instance, in Mintz v. Zoernig, a recipient-mother 
and her partner asked a known donor if he would donate sperm and “serve as a 
male role model” for their child by establishing visitation rights.157  The couple 
would be the primary parents and the donor would have no financial 
 
 151.  Id. at 1246-47. 
 152.  See id. at 1246. 
 153.  See id. at 1248. 
 154.  Id. at 1246. 
 155.  Id. at 1248. 
 156.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also noted another policy rationale against a point-blank 
distinction between known and anonymous donor’s ability to relinquish parental rights and 
responsibilities.  The court stated, “[T]o protect herself and the sperm donor, that would-be mother 
would have no choice but to resort to anonymous donation or abandon her desire to be a biological 
mother, notwithstanding her considered personal preference to conceive using the sperm of someone 
familiar, whose background, traits, and medical history are not shrouded in mystery. To much the 
same end, where a would-be donor cannot trust that he is safe from a future support action, he will 
be considerably less likely to provide his sperm to a friend or acquaintance who asks, significantly 
limiting a would-be mother’s reproductive prerogatives.”  Id. at 1247. 
 157.  Mintz v. Zoernig, 198 P.3d 861, 862 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). 
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responsibilities to the child.158  The recipient-mother conducted an at-home 
insemination and gave birth to a child.159  The donor and couple put their 
agreement in writing after the child’s birth.160  Shortly thereafter, the couple 
ended their relationship.161  The mother then asked the donor if he would agree 
to provide sperm for another insemination under the same terms of the first 
agreement.162  The donor agreed and another child was born.163  In light of the 
agreement, the donor had significant contact with the two children, although the 
recipient-mother acted as the primary parent.164  Shortly thereafter, the mother 
filed a paternity action against the donor seeking child support.165 The parties 
entered into a stipulated order approved by the court in which the donor agreed 
to pay child support.166 On appeal from a motion for modification of child 
support, the donor challenged his obligation to pay child support, even though 
he was current on his payments, and asserted that he was only a mere sperm 
donor.167 
At the time Mintz was decided, New Mexico had a statute in place that 
allowed for a donor to be a legal parent if a licensed physician requirement was 
met and the parties signed a written agreement in which the donor consented.168 
Because the recipient-mother self-inseminated without physician assistance, the 
court found that the donor was not a legal parent pursuant to that statute.169 
However, under a different provision in New Mexico’s UPA, the known donor 
was a presumed father because he held himself out as the children’s father, 
established a relationship with them, had regular visitation with them since 
birth, filed a motion alleging that the mother interfered with his relationship with 
the children by imposing conditions on visitation, acknowledged in the 
stipulated order that he was the natural father, and was registered as both 
children’s father with the vital statistics bureau.170  Thus, the Court of Appeals 
found that the donor was “enjoy[ing] the rights of parenthood” and was 
therefore the children’s legal father.171  The court noted that since the law 
“‘reflects a strong public policy in favor of support,’” the agreement 
 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id.  Note that the specific language and more precise terms of the written agreement were 
not included in the court’s opinion. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. at 862. 
 166.  Id. at 862-63. 
 167.  Id. at 863. 
 168.  Mintz, 198 P.3d at 863.  Note that in 2009, subsequent to the Mintz decision, New Mexico 
amended its Uniform Parentage Act, which now borrows more closely from the 2002 UPA and no 
longer requires physician involvement in artificial insemination.  See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-11A-101 
to -903 (West 2012). 
 169.  See Mintz, 198 P.3d at 863 (noting that “[i]n this case, the sperm was not provided to a 
licensed physician, but rather, Mother inseminated herself. As a result, the artificial insemination 
section of the UPA is not applicable to our facts.”). 
 170.  Id. at 863-64. 
 171.  Id. at 864. 
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relinquishing parental rights was unenforceable and the child support order was 
upheld.172  
In Mintz, assuming that the known donor really was enjoying the full rights 
of legal parenthood, the court’s decision seems right.  Mintz is distinguishable 
from Ferguson because the known donor in Mintz relinquished his parental rights 
but still acted as a legal father.173 Thus, the agreement in Mintz violated public 
policy because the children’s father reaped the benefits of legal parenthood while 
shirking the financial obligations.174  In a situation like Mintz, even if the donor 
relinquishes his parental rights in a written agreement, the court should find the 
agreement unenforceable as it would violate public policy.175 
In addition, Mintz demonstrates the difference between a known donor-
child relationship maintained through visitation rights and a known donor-child 
relationship in which the donor is actually parenting.  If the donor is actually 
parenting the child, he should be given parental rights and his parental 
obligations should be enforced, despite an earlier agreement to the contrary.176  
To this point, Mintz raises the issue of changed circumstances in insemination 
agreements—an issue that will be mentioned in Section VII of this note. 
Moreover, certain factors may aid a court in considering whether an 
agreement relinquishing a donor of parental rights should be enforced.  First, the 
court should not solely apply a best interest of the child standard.177  This is 
because this standard will always weigh in favor of compelling the donor to 
provide support.178  Surely a child benefits more from two sources of financial 
support than just one.  Thus, if a court can conclusively find that the recipient-
mother and the donor agreed that the donor relinquish financial support, the 
court should enforce the agreement.179 
Another factor the court should consider is whether the parties were 
 
 172.  Id. (quoting In re Estate of DeLara, 38 P.3d 198, 201 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001)).  Note also that the 
court doesn’t mention at all that the first child was born with the intent that the recipient-mother’s ex-
lesbian partner would parent the child.  It is beyond the scope of this article but worth wondering 
whether the court should have gone after the former partner for child support for the first child.  It is 
also interesting to consider this in light of the issues surrounding gay marriage and the implications 
for children born to gay couples who are not legally recognized as married or having the same 
obligations of a heterosexual couple.  See id. at 862 (noting that both of “the women would be primary 
parents.”). 
 173.  Id. at 862. 
 174.  Note that the known donor in Mintz was current on child support once the lower court 
ordered it.  However, on appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals he challenged his obligation to 
pay child support.  Id. at 862-63. 
 175.  Note that this assumes that Mintz was really acting as a legal parent to the children.  If he 
was a known donor with visitation rights, then he probably should not have been awarded full 
parental rights and the court should have enforced the visitation agreement, unless it was the parties’ 
intent that the donor have full parental rights. 
 176.  Note that finding that the donor is a legal parent and enforcing his responsibilities pursuant 
to that relationship are both within the best interests of the child because the child will benefit from 
his caretaker having legal authority to make decisions on his behalf. 
 177.  M. Scott Serfozo, Sperm Donor Child Support Obligations: How Courts and Legislatures Should 
Properly Weigh the Interests of the Donor, Donee, and Child, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 715, 734 (2008). 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  See id. 
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involved in a romantic relationship at the time the agreement was made.180  The 
underlying idea is that a donor romantically involved with the recipient-mother 
more likely intends to parent the child than a non-intimate donor who may be 
making a “true” donation with no strings attached.181  A third factor to consider 
is the timing in which the recipient-mother files suit for child support.182  The 
more time that passes between the date that the agreement was entered into and 
the date that the recipient-mother brings suit, the greater the likelihood that the 
parties did not intend for the donor to be a parent to the child.183 
In evaluating whether agreements by known donors to relinquish parental 
rights violate public policy, a court should conduct a fact-specific inquiry into 
both the parties’ intentions and the current relationship between the known 
donor and the child.  If the known donor is not actually parenting while shirking 
his financial obligations, the agreement likely comports with public policy. 
The next section discusses the constitutional barriers that known donors 
seeking parental or visitation rights may face, even with a binding written 
agreement. 
VI. TROXEL V. GRANVILLE: CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO KNOWN DONORS’ RIGHTS 
Often, known donors who develop a relationship with the child they help 
conceive find themselves in a situation where the recipient-mother severs the 
donor’s relationship with the child.  This may be problematic in cases where 
there is a written agreement awarding the known donor visitation.184  Despite the 
written agreement, the Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville may be a 
barrier to known donors who seek to enforce such agreements and receive 
visitation rights. 
In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court struck down a Washington 
visitation statute, which permitted “‘[a]ny person’” at “‘any time’”  to “petition a 
superior court for visitation rights . . . and authorize[d] that court to grant such 
visitation rights whenever ‘visitation may serve the best interest of the child.’”185 
The Supreme Court held Washington’s third-party visitation statute 
unconstitutional as applied because it did not give deference to the children’s 
legal parent, their mother, before awarding visitation to their grandparents.186  
 
 180.  Id. at 734–35. 
 181.  Id. at 735. 
 182.  Id. 
 183. Serfozo, supra note 177, at 735.  For instance, in Ferguson, five years went by before the 
mother sought child support from the known donor and the court found her testimony riddled with 
fraudulent allegations.  See Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1240 (Pa. 2007). 
 184.  Note that in my research I did not find a case on point in which a known donor came into 
court with a written agreement and the Troxel problem arose.  Rather, the most common cases 
construing Troxel involve grandparents and ex-lesbian partners seeking visitation.  However, this 
issue would arise for known donors if they sought visitation through a state’s third-party visitation 
statute or if they sought to have a written agreement enforced and courts determined that Troxel is a 
barrier to enforcing such an agreement. 
 185.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §26.10.160(3) 
(West 2000)). 
 186.  See id. at 67 (“Once the visitation petition has been filed in court and the matter is placed 
before a judge, a parent’s decision that visitation would not be in the child’s best interest is accorded 
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Therefore, the statute infringed on the mother’s fundamental parental rights to 
direct the care, custody, and control of her child.187 Thus, in Troxel, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed a parent’s fundamental right, superseding all other people, to 
direct the upbringing of his or her children. 
After Troxel, the question emerged as to whether a third-party could 
successfully petition for visitation with a child against a fit parent.  The 
underlying rationale for awarding third-party visitation is to safeguard the 
relationship between a child and a non-legal parent who has formed a 
meaningful and legitimate relationship with the child.188  Thus, when known 
donors come into court seeking visitation with a child whom they helped 
procreate and with whom they have an established relationship, courts should 
give weight to written visitation agreements between the known donor and the 
recipient-mother.  This approach does not offend the Court’s ruling in Troxel. 
In the case of a known donor who made a pre-existing written agreement 
with a recipient-mother for visitation rights with her child, the legally binding 
agreement actually defers to the recipient-mother, assuming the contract is 
enforceable. Thus, it does not violate Troxel for a court to equally weigh the rights 
of the known donor and the recipient-mother when the mother authorized the 
donor to share some of her parental rights with her child in a formal and binding 
legal document.  If a mother wishes to retain full protection of her parental 
rights, she “cannot cede over to [a] third party parental authority of the exercise 
of which may create a profound bond with the child.”189  Therefore, if a known 
donor and mother entered into a written visitation agreement, the donor should 
have a right to be heard. 
As a back-up option to having the written agreement enforced, a donor 
petitioning a court in a state with a third-party visitation statute should seek 
visitation through such a statute. After Troxel, third-party visitation statues are 
not per se unconstitutional, nor are a fit parent’s decisions immune from judicial 
review.190  For example, Delaware’s third-party visitation statute is a 
constitutionally permissible mechanism that known donors with an established 
relationship to a child could use to obtain visitation rights.191 Delaware’s third-
party visitation statute provides: 
(a) Prior to granting a third-party visitation order, the Court shall find . . . 
(1) Third party visitation is in the child’s best interests; and 
(2) One of the following as to each parent: 
 
no deference.”). 
 187.  Id. at 57. 
 188.  See id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (focusing on applying the best interests of the child 
standard in third-party visitation cases and protecting legitimate and established relationships 
between a child and third party). 
 189.  V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 552 (N.J. 2000) (reasoning that when a legal parent authorizes a 
third-party, non-legal parent to act as a parent for her child, the legal parent no longer maintains a 
zone of privacy with herself and her child in the context of a de facto parentage action). 
 190.  Fenn v. Sheriff, 109 Cal. App. 4th 1466 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a third-party 
grandparent visitation statute was constitutional). 
 191.  DEL. CODE. ANN.  tit. 13, § 2412 (West 2013). 
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(a) The parent consents to the third-party visitation; 
(b) The child is dependent, neglected, or abused in the parent’s care; 
(c) The parent is deceased; or 
(d) The parent objects to the visitation; however, the petitioner has demonstrated, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that the objection is unreasonable; and has 
demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the visitation will not 
substantially interfere with the parent/child relationship.192 
Although, in the event the legal parent refuses to agree to third-party 
visitation, the petitioner must meet the high evidentiary burden of clear and 
convincing evidence, Delaware’s statute is favorable towards known donors.  
The statute includes the best interests of the child standard, which inherently 
considers the relationship between the donor and the child, and presumes that 
the stronger the relationship between the donor and the child, the more likely an 
award of visitation will be in the best interests of the child.193 
A third-party visitation statute that balances the rights and interests of a 
legal parent, the best interests of the child, and the donor would be a successful 
one.194  For instance, the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and Gay 
and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders developed the following standing 
requirement for third-parties bringing visitation petitions: A petitioner must 
show:  
(1) [T]he curtailment of a significant relationship with the children of a quality 
and depth that sets petitioner[] apart from the many people, even blood relatives, 
with whom children have positive, loving relationships, coupled with (2) a 
showing of prior parental knowledge and fostering of the relationship that 
allowed it to grow in importance to a child.195  
Only after clearing this standing requirement will the court proceed and 
apply a best interest of the child standard.196  The first prong accounts for the 
donor’s interest in his established relationship with the child, the second prong 
protects the legal parent’s rights because it requires consent to the donor-child 
relationship, and the best interests of the child standard protects the welfare of 
the child.  A statutory scheme that balances these three interests is a favorable 
one. 
A written agreement between the known donor and recipient-mother may 
persuade a court to allow a donor to petition for visitation, and to view that 
petition on equal footing with the mother’s position, despite Troxel. In addition, 
third-party visitation statutes that balance the interests of the known donor, the 
 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  See Sally  Goldfarb, Visitation for Nonparents after Troxel v. Granville: Where Should States Draw 
the Line? 32 RUTGERS L.J. 783, 800 (2001) (“[O]nce a parent has decided to allow someone to share the 
parental role . . . the interests of both the child and the nonparent in maintaining the significant bond 
between them . . . warrant granting standing to the nonparent to seek a visitation order.”). 
 195.  Brief of Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund &  Gay &  Lesbian Advocates &  
Defenders as Amici Curiae in Support of  Respondent at 7, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (No. 
99-138). 
 196.  Id. at 8. 
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legal parent, and the child could result in successful visitation claims 
VII. PROPOSAL: WHAT SHOULD A WRITTEN AGREEMENT LOOK LIKE? 
This note has demonstrated that certain state laws and court decisions 
regulating ART are problematic because they do not apply an intent-based 
approach to determinations of a donor’s rights.  I propose that the best 
mechanism for honoring the intent of the known donors and recipient-mother is 
a written agreement that sets out the rights and expectations of the parties.  An 
agreement where the parties decide the donor will relinquish full parental rights, 
retain full parental rights, or have continued involvement with the child in the 
form of visitation rights, should all be in writing. 
First, state laws should require that written agreements be entered into prior 
to the child’s conception; that is, before the insemination takes place. The 
purpose of this requirement is to ensure that both parties enter into the 
agreement at a time when they have equal bargaining power.197  The agreement 
should look like an arm’s length transaction, where the agreement is entered into 
voluntarily, i.e. without compulsion or duress, and the parties act in their own 
self-interest.198 An agreement should be the result of fair dealing, which includes 
real negotiations between the parties and the ability to choose.199 Requiring the 
known donor and recipient-mother to enter into the agreement prior to the 
insemination is an attempt to ensure equal bargaining and encourage the 
drafting of a fair and honest agreement. In addition, entering into the agreement 
prior to insemination encourages early resolution of conflicts and an early 
determination of each party’s rights.200  Therefore, I propose that known donors 
and recipient-mothers be required by law to enter into an agreement prior to 
insemination. 
Second, the written agreement must “reflect the parties’ careful 
consideration of the implications of such an agreement and a thorough 
understanding of its meaning and import.”201 One way this may be 
demonstrated is through the formality of the agreement. The written agreement 
construed in In re Paternity of M.F. is an example of the formalities and 
comprehensiveness of a pre-insemination agreement. In Paternity of M.F., the 
known donor waived all rights to custody or visitation with the child and the 
mother waived all rights to child support and financial assistance from the 
donor.202  The court enforced the agreement in part because it was a 
 
 197.  See In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1039 (Kan. 2007) (commenting on Kansas’ written agreement 
opt-out provision: “the design of the statute implicitly encourages early resolution of . . .  whether a 
donor will have parental rights . . . the parties must decide whether they will enter into a written 
agreement before any donation is made, while there is still balanced bargaining power on both sides 
of the parenting equation.”). 
 198.  See Walters v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Revision, 546 N.E.2d 932, 933 (Ohio 1989) (listing the 
elements of an arms’ length transaction). 
 199.  See Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1519, 1533-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) 
(stating that contracts may be unconscionable when there is an inequality of bargaining power 
between the parties). 
 200.  See K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1039. 
 201.  In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 
 202.  Id. at 1257. 
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comprehensive and formal contract.203 The document was six pages and twenty-
four paragraphs; it had been prepared by an attorney, as so stated in the 
agreement and included provisions regarding the acknowledgement of rights 
and obligations, waiver, consent to adopt, mediation and arbitration, amending 
the agreement, a four-corners clause, and a choice of law provision.204  The 
parties also included a clause entitled “Legal Construction,” which provided that 
each party understood that legal questions could arise from the issues in the 
agreement which had not been settled by statute or court decisions, but 
nonetheless entered into the agreement with “the intent and desire that it be fully 
enforceable . . . and to document their intent at the time the child was 
conceived.”205  The court went on to state that it was hesitant to set out formal 
requirements for the form and content of all ART contracts but reiterated that the 
agreement should reflect the careful consideration of the parties.206  The court did 
note, however, that it “[did] not mean to sanction the view that a writing 
consisting of a few lines scribbled on the back of a scrap of paper found lying 
about will suffice in this kind of case.”207  Thus, the formality and 
comprehensiveness of the written agreement in Paternity of M.F. is a good 
paradigm for a contract between a known donor and recipient-mother. 
Third, aside from the written agreement’s formalness and legal provisions, 
it should contain certain provisions and terms that are detailed enough to be 
useful in the event of a dispute.  This will vary depending on the party’s 
arrangement.  For instance, an agreement in which a known donor intends to 
relinquish full parental rights, including custody and visitation, and the 
recipient-mother intends to waive her rights to child support and financial 
assistance will be sufficiently detailed if it essentially states just that.  The 
contract in Paternity of M.F. is a good example of this.  The contract read: 
Mother hereby waives all rights to child support and financial assistance from 
Donor, including assistance with medical and hospital expenses incurred as a 
result of her pregnancy and delivery . . . . It is expressly agreed that Mother will 
be solely responsible for the financial support of the child. . . . Donor hereby 
waives all rights to custody of or visitation with such child and releases Mother 
from any and all claims for visitation and covenants and that he will not 
demand, request or compel any guardianship, custody or visitation rights with 
any such child.208 
This provision is sufficiently detailed and should be encouraged.  However, 
a simpler agreement stating that the donor relinquishes parental rights and the 
mother waives the right to child support could be sufficiently adequate as well. 
 
 203.  Id. at 1261-62. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. at 1262. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. at 1261. 
 208.  Id. at 1257 (The agreement goes on to state that the mother will be responsible for all “legal, 
financial, child-rearing and medical needs of such child without any involvement by or demands of 
authority from Donor, and Donor expressly agrees that Mother shall have sole physical and legal 
custody of such child and that Mother’s custody of such child is in the child’s best interest.”  Id. at 
1258.). 
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By contrast, an agreement where the known donor retains either full 
parental rights or visitation rights should be much more detailed since such an 
arrangement allocates caretaking to each party. In these cases, the agreement 
should adhere more closely to child custody agreements and comport with state 
law. The difficulty with this approach is that state child custody laws assume 
that a child already exists, which makes it easier for the parties to make an 
agreement based on their daily routines.  Still, an agreement between a known 
donor and recipient-mother should specify if the arrangement is for sole or joint 
custody, and include the residential and decision-making arrangements for the 
child.209  The agreement can also list the areas over which one or both parties has 
decision-making authority, like education, healthcare,210 and religious 
upbringing.  Similarly, an agreement that gives the known donor visitation 
rights, while relinquishing parental rights, should specify the frequency of 
visitation, where the visitation will take place, whether it is supervised by the 
legal mother or not, and any limitations on the basis of time, travel, and 
activity.211 
Furthermore, like all child custody arrangements, the agreement should be 
subject to modification. The standard for modification should be changed 
circumstances that affect the welfare of the child.212  Changed circumstances 
should be broadly defined and may include lack of stability in the living or 
childcare situation, the child’s poor performance in school, changes in the child’s 
health, and changes in the parents’ circumstances.213  The driving factor behind a 
modification should be the best interests of the child.  The ability to modify the 
donor and mother’s agreement is very important in the ART situation since the 
agreement will be reached prior to the child’s conception and the parties’ 
documented aspirations may either fall short of or supersede the pragmatism of 
the arrangement once the child is born.214 
Fourth, as previously mentioned, to be enforceable, a written agreement 
between the known donor and recipient-mother must not violate public policy.215  
One way to determine if a written agreement is valid against public policy is if it 
comports with the requirements of uniform acts, such as the UPA.216 I propose 
that if a written agreement comports with the requirements of the 2002 UPA, 
Article 7: Children of Assisted Reproduction, it does not violate public policy.  
Some key guidelines from Article 7 are as follows: A child conceived through 
 
 209.  Id. at 1257 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Unfortunately in my research, I was unable to find a sufficiently detailed agreement where a 
donor retains full parental rights or where a donor is given visitation rights.  This is actually fitting as 
it demonstrates the lack of specificity and formality that parties currently exercise in entering into 
ART contracts. 
 212.  See Wilson v. Wilson, No. FM-04-298-00, 2006 WL 848128, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
April 3, 2006) (per curiam) (parties seeking to modify custody “must demonstrate changed 
circumstances which affect the welfare of the children.”(citations omitted)). 
 213.  See id. 
 214.  See supra Section V and the accompanying discussion about the Mintz case. 
 215.  See supra Section V. 
 216.  See In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that the UPA is 
an “excellent tool for ensuring that contracts for these services do not violate our public policy of 
protecting the welfare of children.” (citation omitted)). 
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sexual intercourse is not a child of assisted reproduction and not subject to 
Article 7,217 a licensed physician need not be involved in the procedure for 
assisted reproduction,218 the act applies to both married and single women,219 
and the determination of parentage is based on which parties intended to parent 
the child.220  This last requirement gives the written agreement legal force by 
allowing the parties to include their intentions in the contract.  Even though the 
UPA discusses parentage, I propose that the intent requirement also apply to the 
intent to relinquish parental rights and the intent to permit and partake in 
visitation rights. 
Nothing in the 2002 UPA prevents parties engaging in artificial 
insemination from forming a legally binding written agreement.221  Therefore, an 
agreement between the parties that gives the known donor visitation rights, 
retains his full parental rights, or relinquishes his full parental rights is valid if it 
complies with the 2002 UPA.  In addition, a written agreement should be found 
compliant with public policy if it satisfies the earlier discussion of concerns 
raised in Ferguson and Mintz.222 Even if a written agreement complies with the 
2002 UPA, if, in reality, it amounts to a legal parent shirking his parental 
responsibilities, the contract will not be enforced. 
Lastly, it may be a concern that the written agreement requirement imposes 
state intervention into the family realm and requires the parties to enlist a 
lawyer. While I have considered this in my proposal, I have concluded that, 
based on the case law mentioned in this note, and other cases that are not 
mentioned, it is in the parties’ best interests to create a formal written agreement 
enforceable in a court of law. The written agreement serves to protect the unique 
arrangement that the parties have contemplated. If the parties do not commit 
their agreement to writing, they leave themselves vulnerable to an unpredictable 
and possibly unfavorable outcome if a dispute arises down the line. 
In sum, I propose that state law require parties engaging in assisted 
reproductive technology to enter into formal, written contracts expressing their 
intentions and rights. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
As the number of “non-traditional” families increase, it becomes more and 
more important for our legislatures to enact laws that enable these new families. 
Current law governing determinations of known donors’ rights falls short of this 
task and leads to results that do not honor the intentions of parties who utilize 
assisted reproductive technology. For this reason, requiring known donors and 
recipient-mothers to enter into written, pre-insemination agreements is vital to 
ensuring that children of assisted reproductive technology are born into the arms 
of their intended caretakers. It is these caretakers who have the child’s best 
 
 217.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701(2002). 
 218.  Id. at § 702 cmnt. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  See id. at § 703 (“A man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by a 
woman . . . with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the resulting child.”). 
 221.  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (2002). 
 222.  See supra Section V and accompanying discussion of public policy concerns. 
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interests in mind and who are in the best position to love and raise that child. 
Private contracting allows for each individual to freely construct his or her family 
in a personal and meaningful way. It is incumbent upon U.S. legislatures and 
courts to push for changes in the law that will preserve this precious human 
inclination to procreate with, parent with, and love whomever one chooses. 
 
